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REPLY ARGUMENT1
Google does not dispute that it copied Oracle’s work as wantonly 
as our hypothetical Ann Droid copied Harry Potter.  It does not dispute 
that the work it copied was, in its realm, as creative as a novel:  
Without a hint of dissent, Google parrots Oracle’s demonstration that 
the copied work was “‘original,’ … ‘intuitive,’ ‘attractive,’ ‘appealing,’ 
‘intricate,’ ‘efficient,’ and ‘user-friendly.’”  GB 5 (OB citations omitted).  
Nor does it dispute that its defenses are equivalent to Ann’s defenses, 
“But I wrote most of the words from scratch,” and “I copied only the 
portions necessary to tap into the Harry Potter fan base.”  And it agrees 
that Ann could never get away with those defenses.  But Google should 
get away with those same defenses, it insists, for one simple reason:  
Oracle’s work—“[h]owever creative and useful”—is not a “work of 
imaginative fiction like Harry Potter,” but a computer program that “is 
fundamentally a functional, utilitarian work.”  GB 1. 
Google concedes that § 102 of the Copyright Act, which defines 
copyrightability, codifies the traditional dichotomy between ideas and 
                                     
1 For ease of reference: “OB” is Oracle’s Opening Brief, “GB” is 
Google’s Brief, and amicus briefs will be cited as “___ Br.,” according to 
name or abbreviation of the lead amicus.
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2expression.  But it avoids the consequence of that concession:  an 
original work—even one that has a function—is entitled to copyright 
protection so long as the author had multiple possible ways to express 
an idea.  Instead, Google asserts that if a computer program—or any 
other literary work—is functional, it loses protection no matter how 
creative it is.  Google never explains how any software can be protected 
under its view, since all computer programs are “fundamentally a 
functional, utilitarian work.”  GB 1.
Google only emphasizes its lack of case support by filling its brief 
with quotations from the writings of an academic who has, for decades, 
argued for changes in the law on the ground that Congress never should 
have granted copyright protection to software.  Beyond that, Google’s 
effort to portray its position as Ninth Circuit law revolves around a 
single sentence plucked out of context from Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (1993).  Google ignores the section of Sega
that held that creative software is protectable, relying instead on the 
fair-use analysis which has nothing to do with copyrightability.
As eager as Google is to import fair-use principles into 
copyrightability, it offers only the most cursory response to Oracle’s 
Case: 13-1021      Document: 134     Page: 13     Filed: 07/03/2013
3argument that the copying was unfair as a matter of law.  Google copied 
the most useful portions of Oracle’s work for commercial purposes and 
derailed Oracle’s already-thriving business of licensing Java for mobile 
devices.  Google tries to portray this as fair by cobbling together 
snippets of the trial record into a narrative that is itself a work of 
“imaginative fiction,” a story the district court already rejected.  
A24,654-56.  
For example, Google repeatedly asserts that Oracle’s software 
packages were “open and free for anyone to use.”  GB 9-10, 16, 34.  That 
is nothing but a play on words.  As this Court recognizes, that is not 
what “open source” means.  Open-source licenses “are used by … 
software developers … who wish to create collaborative projects and to 
dedicate certain works to the public,” while, at the same time, 
“provid[ing] creators of copyrighted materials a means to protect and 
control their copyrights.”  Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 
(2008) (emphasis added).  Google does not dispute that every other 
business that wanted to put Oracle’s Java packages to commercial 
use—including businesses that wanted to use only the declaring code—
took licenses.  OB 2, 15-16, 76-77.
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4Equally fictitious is Google’s protestation that it was shocked to 
learn of the “Java copyrights.”  GB 17 & n.79.  The feigned surprise 
comes at the end of a paragraph acknowledging that Google was in 
intense negotiations about “taking a license” to the very packages it 
copied.  GB 17.  And nowhere does Google dispute that its head of 
Android reported up the chain of command that the Java packages “are 
copyrighted[,] [a]nd Sun gets to say who they license … to,” A1200; see 
A2689; OB 18-20, or that Google considered “buy[ing] the rights to Java 
from Sun (patents, copyrights, etc[.]),” A2191 (emphasis added).  Google 
has more copyright lawyers than an AIPLA conference.  It did not need 
a tutorial from Oracle to know that it was unlawful to plagiarize.
To take one final example, Google asserts that Sun welcomed 
“Android with open arms.”  GB 20.  In support, Google cites a blog post.  
Google does not suggest that its platoons of copyright lawyers mistook 
the post for the elusive license it had tried for years to secure.  In any 
event, the post was written before Google first released Android’s code 
to outside programmers.  A2198, 5828-31, 6541.  Until that release, 
Oracle “presumed” that Google either (1) used “GPL [General Public
License] code” and would donate the code back to Oracle under the 
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5open-source terms of the GPL license, A22,198; OB 14 (describing GPL), 
or (2) would take a commercial license, A2685, 2688-90, 5828-30.
Fairly portrayed, the undisputed record confirms that there was 
nothing fair about Google’s copying.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW PROTECTS ORACLE’S SOFTWARE
PACKAGES.
This case is about copyright protection for computer software—
here, the particular declaring code and organization Oracle used in 
Java SE.  We warned of the mischief from using the verbal chameleon 
“API” to describe these packages of code.  OB 9.  Google and its amici 
exploit the ambiguity for maximum advantage, accusing Oracle of 
imperiling anything that might be called an API, including “interfaces,” 
GB 52, “access protocols,” “interface specifications,” CCIA Br. 3, 12-13, 
“network sockets,” “rules for how programs communicate within a 
single computer,” “firmware,” and “hardware,” Computer Scientists Br. 
6-7, 12-15, 23, 31; see Start-ups Br. 3, 10.  This case is not about those 
abstractions or devices.  It is only about protection for intricate and 
highly creative packages of software that Oracle authored.
As to the packages actually before this Court, Google concedes 
away all that matters—at least under established copyright principles.  
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6§ I.A.  Unable to prevail under settled principles, Google concocts a 
veritable mash of copyright law, consisting of large helpings of fair-use 
doctrine and infringement principles but only a trace of copyrightability 
law.  The concoction bears no relation to the law Congress adopted, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, and just about every circuit, 
including the Ninth Circuit and this Court.  
Google’s position rests on several flawed premises.  First, it rests 
on a reading of § 102 that the Supreme Court rejects.  § I.B.  Second, 
Google incorrectly asserts that the fair-use analyses of Sega and Sony 
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2000), dispose of the case.  § I.C.  Then Google makes merger and 
interoperability arguments that have no bearing on the copyrightability 
of the original work in question (Java packages).  § I.D.  Finally, Google 
resorts to a meritless waiver argument, § I.E, and to policy arguments 
that are best addressed to Congress, § I.F.
A. Google Concedes Away The Entire Case, At Least 
Under Established Copyright Principles, And Declines 
To Rebut Half The Copyrightability Arguments.
Google concedes away—either explicitly or tacitly—everything 
necessary to resolve this case under established copyright principles.  
Case: 13-1021      Document: 134     Page: 17     Filed: 07/03/2013
7To start, Google concedes that it literally copied “7,000 lines of declaring 
code,” GB 63; accord GB 18, and does not dispute that “the structure, 
sequence and organization of the 37 accused API packages in Android is
substantially the same as the structure, sequence and organization of 
the corresponding 37 API packages in Java,” A985, 22,771-72 (cited by 
OB 43).   
These concessions collapse the challenge to the district court’s 
ruling into a single question:  Is there any protected expression at all in 
either the copied code or the copied structure?  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).  Google does not dispute 
that copyright protection extends to computer programs—both to the 
literal elements and to structure and organization.  See GB 2, 37, 42-44; 
OB 4, 31-32, 41, 44-45.  Google then makes a key—indeed, a 
dispositive—concession:  that the declaring code and the structure and 
organization of the packages are original under § 102. GB 5, 29-30.  
Google also does not challenge—and even concedes—the district court’s 
finding that the declaring code could have been written in any number 
of ways “and still have worked,” A132; accord A133, 140-41, and that 
the packages could have been organized in “many ways … [and] still 
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8duplicate[d] the same range of functionality,” A133.  See A24,670 
(Google’s concession); see also OB 32-33, 49-52, 60-61.  Indeed, Google 
goes one step further:  It acknowledges Oracle’s extensive showing that 
the packages are “‘original,’ ‘creative,’ ‘intuitive,’ ‘attractive,’ ‘appealing,’ 
‘intricate,’ ‘efficient,’ and ‘user-friendly.’”  GB 5 (OB cites omitted); see 
OB 12-13, 30 (district court’s finding), 38-40, 40-43 (declaring code), 43-
48 (structure and organization); McNealy Br. 10-20.  But Google does 
not dispute a word of that showing.
As our opening brief demonstrated (at 40-66), these concessions 
are dispositive under established copyright principles.  Copyright 
protects original expression.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.  The protection 
persists even if the original expression also performs a function or is 
contained within a method of operation.  Under the classic 
idea/expression dichotomy that the Supreme Court famously articulated 
in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), the only time expression is not 
protectable is if the author’s expression is the only possible way to 
achieve the result, in which case the idea and the expression merge and 
protecting the expression is tantamount to protecting the idea.  OB 32-
33, 48-49.  But so long as there are multiple ways to express that 
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9function or perform that process or method, the work is protectable.  
OB 49-53.  
Our opening brief documented all these points at length and with 
numerous citations to caselaw.  Google does not suggest that Oracle 
misquoted these authorities or otherwise misstated established 
copyright law.  Yet, beyond paying occasional lip service to some of 
these principles, see, e.g., GB 47-53, Google ignores them along with the 
cases—from this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and numerous others—that 
articulate and apply them to computer programs.
Google’s silent treatment extends to more than just established 
copyright principles.  Google also makes the startling strategic decision 
to ignore half of Oracle’s copyrightability argument and to abandon any 
effort to defend the keystone of the district court’s copyrightability 
decision.  As explained, Oracle presses “two distinct bases” for finding 
copyrightability:  “(1) the expressive declaring code; and (2) the creative 
arrangement of each package.”  OB 40.  Google largely ignores the first.  
As if to lampoon its own stance, Google asserts that it “did not use” any 
of Oracle’s “underlying computer code … —unless one counts the 7,000 
lines of declaring code” that Google copied.  GB 63 (internal quotation 
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marks omitted).  They count.  Front and center in the opening brief was 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 
(1985), the dominant Supreme Court case on “admitted” plagiarism.  
OB 40-41.  Google does not even cite, much less discuss, this case.  
Similarly, a centerpiece of the district court’s copyrightability 
holding was that declaring code is unprotected as short phrases.  
A143-44, 162, 164-65.  Google leaves a lengthy attack on that holding
unrebutted.  OB 53-57; see GB 68.  Oracle demonstrated that the 
regulation covering short phrases prohibits protection for a “work” that 
consists of nothing but a naked phrase but does not remove protection 
for an assemblage of 7000 lines of code.  OB 53-55 (collecting cases).  
Google does not disagree.  Oracle demonstrated that much of the 
declaring code reads more like run-on sentences than short phrases.  
OB 56.  No response.  Quoting Google’s Java guru, Oracle demonstrated 
that there can be—and is here—“creativity and artistry in a single 
method declaration.”  OB 56-57.  Again, nothing from Google.
Google buries its excuse in the recesses of its brief (at 67):  It 
asserts that the district court wasted its time in analyzing these issues 
after the verdict, because they were waived at trial.  That is as absurd 
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as it sounds and, for reasons explained below (at 39-42), demonstrably 
false.  For present purposes, suffice it to say that if Google is wrong 
about waiver, this Court can reverse without reading another page of 
this copyrightability argument (and jump straight to fair use).
B. The Traditional Understanding Of § 102(b) Does Not 
Strip Creative Computer Programs Of Copyright 
Protection.
Google urges a copyright construct that flouts every established 
copyright principle described above.  The crux of Google’s argument is 
that the protection § 102(a) grants with one hand, § 102(b) withdraws 
with the other, because the copied expression, though original and 
creative, is a “functional element.”  GB 2.  
Section 102 provides in relevant part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists … in original works of 
authorship …. Works of authorship include … literary works 
….  
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery ….   
17 U.S.C. § 102.  The parties present two starkly different readings of 
§ 102.  Oracle’s reading is supported by the overwhelming weight of 
Case: 13-1021      Document: 134     Page: 22     Filed: 07/03/2013
12
authority.  In support of its alternative reading, Google cites mainly law 
review articles.
Oracle’s reading of § 102.  Section 102 codifies the traditional 
idea/expression dichotomy described above and the merger doctrine that 
flows from it.  OB 59-63.  At one point, Google agrees, conceding that 
§ “102(b) codifies the Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Baker v. 
Selden.”  GB 31; accord GB 33.  This is undoubtedly correct.  Explains 
the Supreme Court:  “‘Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the 
scope of copyright protection under the present law.  Its purpose is to 
restate[, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright,] 
that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains 
unchanged.’”  Feist, 499 U.S. at 356 (bracketed text omitted in Feist) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5670, and S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 54 (1975) available at
1975 WL 370212).  In other words, § “102(b) is intended … to make 
clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the 
copyrightable element in a computer program” while “the actual 
processes or methods embodied in the program are not.”  H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, at 57.
Case: 13-1021      Document: 134     Page: 23     Filed: 07/03/2013
13
Again, Google seems to agree:  Quoting the same congressional 
reports relied on by Feist above, Google argues that § “102(b) … 
‘make[s] clear’ that ‘the writing expressing a programmer’s ideas’—that 
is, the code—is ‘the copyrightable element in a computer program,’ 
while ‘the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not 
within the scope of the copyright law.’”  GB 30-31 (alterations omitted; 
emphasis altered); accord OB 59-60.  Exactly so.  “[T]he writing 
expressing a programmer’s ideas” is “the code”—here, the declaring 
code—which is protectable.
Google never acknowledges the consequence of these concessions.  
This Court’s decision in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 
975 F.2d 832 (1992) (discussed at length in our opening brief (at 41-42, 
44-45, 49, 60)) is instructive.  Atari involved the copyrightability of 
Nintendo’s program to unlock its gaming console by transmitting a 
unique message from the game to the console.  Under Atari, the “idea” 
of a particular method or class is whatever function it is designed to 
perform (like sending a data signal, 975 F.2d at 840, or opening an 
internet connection, OB 9-10).  Oracle cannot copyright the idea of 
programs that open an internet connection.  But it can copyright the 
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precise strings of code used to do so, at least so long as “other language 
is available” to achieve the same function.  National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report (“CONTU 
Report”) at 20 (1979); accord Atari, 975 F.2d at 840 (no merger when 
“alternative expressions are available”); see OB 32-34, 48-52, 59-62.  
Critically, Google does not suggest that Oracle is trying to protect 
the idea of any of its packages.  Nor could it, in light of the district 
court’s unchallenged finding that the declaring code could have been 
written and organized in any number of ways and still achieved all the 
same functions.  Supra at 7-8 (citing A132-33, 140-41; OB 32-33, 49-52, 
60-61).  Accordingly, under the principles Google claims to embrace, 
§ 102(b) does not strip the highly expressive and creative packages and 
their declaring code of protection just because they also perform 
functions.  See also Oman (former Copyright Register) Br. 7.
Google’s reading of § 102.  Despite its concessions, Google 
recasts § 102 in a way that bears no resemblance to Baker’s 
idea/expression distinction, traditional merger analysis, or any other 
longstanding copyright norm.  Google maintains that § 102 requires a 
“two-stage copyrightability analysis.”  GB 29.  In step (a), you assess 
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“[o]riginality and creativity.”  GB 45.  But no matter how original and 
creative a work, Google maintains, step (b) lists a series of “exclusions” 
that withdraw protection to “functional and factual aspects of an 
otherwise copyrightable work.”  GB 30.  Thus, according to Google, the 
packages would receive copyright protection under subsection (a) 
because they are “original,” but subsection (b) would then extinguish 
every trace of copyright protection because the code is also functional.  
Under Google’s reading, unlike in established merger analysis, it 
matters not that there were infinite ways in which Oracle could have 
written and organized the declaring code to express the thousands of 
functions performed by the packages.  GB 45.  All that matters to 
Google is that the code performs a function.
If Google’s reading is right, then Congress played a trick on the 
software industry.  Congress defined “literary work” to encompass 
computer programs, thereby granting protection to “original” software 
at step (a).  But it then withdrew protection from all software at 
step (b), because computer code always performs a function.  OB 61-62.  
And to guarantee that no software would ever survive step (b), Congress 
defined “computer program” in functional terms: as a “set of statements 
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or instructions [that are] used directly or indirectly in a computer in 
order to bring about a certain result.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).  
Google does not try to suggest a limiting principle that would strip only 
Oracle’s declaring code of protection but somehow leave other software 
intact.  The most Google (and its amici) can muster is the tepid 
assurance that Oracle’s implementing code “may be copyrightable.”  
GB 65 n.165; see Rackspace Br. 4.  But since implementing code is also 
“functional[],” GB 13 n.49, there is no distinction.  Thus, in one fell 
swoop, Google’s statutory construct wipes out the unanimous view of 
the courts and Congress that software has copyright protection.  
OB 31-32, 37, 41, 44-45 (collecting cases); see Oman Br. 7-8, 14-17.  
Actually, if Google is right, the trick is on just about every author 
of any literary work.  Google insists that “the same rules of 
copyrightability” apply to “all works.”  GB 42.  So, any original work 
that is also “functional” or “utilitarian” loses copyright protection: 
encyclopedias, textbooks, The Bluebook, instruction manuals, maps, car 
value guides, dental and medical taxonomies, and any other work 
(“[h]owever creative”) that is also “functional” or “utilitarian.”  GB 1; see 
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 978 (7th 
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Cir. 1997).  Moreover, the way § 102 is structured, what is true of a 
“method of operation” must be true of “any idea, … concept, [or] 
principle.”  So by Google’s reading, every “original” work would get 
protection at step (a), but would lose it in step (b) if it also expresses 
“any idea.”
Google’s proposed hermetic division between subsections (a) and 
(b) is wrong.  Over 50 years ago, the Supreme Court observed:  “We find 
nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the 
intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars 
or invalidates its registration.  We do not read such a limitation into the 
copyright law.”  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).  The same is 
evident from the CONTU Report, whose recommendations Congress 
adopted “almost verbatim” and which is considered “the authoritative 
guide to congressional intent.”  Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519 n.5.  Invoking 
Baker, CONTU rejected Google’s position, specifically as to software:  
“Nor has copyright been denied to works simply because of their 
utilitarian aspects.… That the words of a program are used ultimately 
in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their 
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copyrightability.”   CONTU Report at 21 (emphasis added); see BSA Br. 
8-11 (discussing CONTU Report).
Google does not even try to reconcile its two-step analysis with the 
authorities cited above and in the opening brief granting full copyright 
protection to computer code even though it performs functions.  
OB 41-45, 49, 60.  If Google’s two-step approach were the law, this 
Court in Atari would not have held the 10NES protectable because it 
served the function of locking and “unlock[ing] the NES console.”  975 
F.2d at 840.  And Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.
would not have granted copyright protection to “operating system 
program[s]” that performed functions, including “allow[ing] data to be 
passed between different parts of a program,” “turn[ing] on the 
[computer’s] circuits,” “translat[ing] instructions,” and “control[ing] the 
reading and writing functions of the disks.”  714 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1983); see Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 
F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989).
Again and again, courts find computer programs copyrightable—
despite their “utilitarian” or “functional” purpose—because the 
developers had “some discretion and opportunity for creativity … in the 
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structure” of the program.  Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1176.  Thus, 
courts routinely read Baker’s idea/expression principles to find 
programs protectable simply because their authors seek protection of 
their own expression—their own way of implementing the function, 
their own “expressi[ve]” “structure, sequence, and organization of the 
[program],” id. at 1175-76—and not the function itself.  Atari, 975 F.2d 
at 839; accord Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 885 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (“variety of ways to perform the same function 
sustains the classification of such works as ‘expression’”); Mitel, Inc. v. 
Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Section 102(b) does 
not extinguish the protection accorded a particular expression of an idea 
merely because that expression is embodied in a method of operation at 
a higher level of abstraction”; thus, “an element … may be characterized 
as a method of operation, … [and] nevertheless contain expression that 
is eligible for copyright protection”); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 
F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (§ “102(b) does not answer the question 
of whether [plaintiff’s] particular expression of that idea is 
copyrightable”); see also Oman Br. 3, 14-15, 18.  
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Only one case has ever so much as suggested “that expression that 
is part of a ‘method of operation’ cannot be copyrighted.”  Lotus Dev. 
Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an 
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).  It is hard to believe that 
Lotus actually meant to be quite that expansive, particularly in light of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Feist.  But if it did, the case cannot 
overcome this Court’s opposite conclusion, interpreting Ninth Circuit 
law, that “expression of [a] process or method” is protectable.  Atari, 975 
F.2d at 839.  
The statement in Lotus quoted above elicited howls of protest 
among commentators, the most vocal of whom is now Google’s Senior 
Copyright Counsel, William Patry,2 who lambasted the case for the 
shallowness of its logic (e.g., “not even bother[ing] to cite the definition 
[of computer program]”); “[i]gnoring Congress’s judgment and the 
objective standard of originality”; and making “all computer programs 
… unprotectable methods of operation.”  William F. Patry, Copyright 
and Computer Programs: It’s All in the Definition, 14 Cardozo Arts & 
                                     
2 Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_F._Patry (last accessed, July 
2, 2013).
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Ent. L. J. 1, 5-8, 13, 59-63 (1996) (footnote omitted)); see Paul I. 
Kravetz, “Idea/Expression Dichotomy” and “Method of Operation”: 
Determining Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 8 DePaul 
Bus. L. J. 75, 77, 97-101 (1995) (predicting that Lotus “will seriously 
impact the software industry”).
While Google contends (at 3, 61) that the Ninth Circuit has 
embraced Lotus, the truth is that, in the 18 years since Lotus, the Ninth 
Circuit has cited Lotus only once—as subsequent history on a 
procedural issue (delay in filing).  In fact, as demonstrated below (at 
24-25), the two Ninth Circuit cases that Google relies upon most—Sony 
and Sega—tacitly reject Lotus by finding the software copyrighted.  See
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (discussing dueling 
options to address copyright for software).  When presented with the 
opportunity, the Ninth Circuit will undoubtedly embrace this Court’s 
reading of Ninth Circuit law and explicitly reject Lotus, like the Tenth 
Circuit.  Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1372; see OB 62-63.
But this Court need not join the chorus of Lotus detractors here.  
It can simply distinguish Lotus.  First, Google copied Oracle’s code 
verbatim, but, as Google concedes (at 58, 63), the Lotus defendant did 
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not, 49 F.3d at 810.  Second, Lotus found that the rudimentary 
commands that were copied (“copy,” “print,” etc.) were not creative.  Id.
at 809, 817; accord id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).  By contrast, the 
declaring code and the structure and organization here are 
undisputedly creative and original.  GB 5, 29-30.  Third, while the 
commands in Lotus were “essential to operating Lotus,” id. at 817, the 
same is not true of the vast majority of what Google copied, infra at 32.
Perhaps the best evidence of how far Google’s reading of § 102 
strays from the caselaw lies in how heavily Google relies on articles—
specifically, the writings of one author, Professor Pamela Samuelson (on 
this topic, GB 30-33, and others, GB 40, 51).  See also Law Professor Br. 
7-8, 10.  Google cribs so much from this one academic that she should 
demand royalties.  The professor “firmly believes” that Congress was 
wrong to grant copyright protection to computer programs and should 
have created “a new form of intellectual property law.”  Pamela 
Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection 
for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 Duke L.J. 
663, 764 (1984).  That is what Google is pressing as well: a new form of 
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intellectual property law that, in the unanimous view of the Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit, and this Court, Congress has rejected. 
C. Sega’s and Sony’s Fair-Use Analysis And Other Cases 
Considering Infringement Have No Bearing On 
Whether Oracle’s Software Packages Are 
Copyrightable.
Google’s § 102 argument, however flawed, at least addresses the 
right issue: copyrightability.  The same cannot be said of the rest of 
Google’s argument, particularly its focus on fair-use and infringement 
principles in Sega and Sony.
Sega and Sony on fair use.  A keystone of Google’s argument is 
that “Sega and Sony dispose of Oracle’s key [copyrightability] 
arguments.”  GB 40.  Google cites those two cases—Sega in particular—
on virtually every page of its 27-page copyrightability discussion, 
GB 28, 31, 33-34, 36-44, 46, 48-49, 52, and quotes one isolated sentence 
in Sega six times, GB 3, 36, 38, 42-43, 50, 52.  But those portions of the 
opinions discuss fair use, not copyrightability, and Google ignores what 
those cases teach about copyrightability.  
Sega sold video games to run on its own consoles.  A competitor 
(Accolade) wanted to distribute its own games to run on Sega’s console.  
So it made copies of the software in Sega’s games to learn how they 
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worked and to figure out how to make the console play Accolade’s 
games.  977 F.2d at 1514-15, 1523-27.  In Sony, a competitor 
(Connectix) wanted to create a program that could play PlayStation 
games on computers (not just on PlayStation consoles).  So Connectix 
copied chunks of Sony’s code to learn how the console functioned.  203 
F.3d at 593. In each case, the infringement allegation centered around 
the copies these competitors made of the games’ software for research 
and development purposes.  And in each, the defendant asserted that 
making those copies was fair use.
Before ever getting to fair use, Sega discussed at length the 
threshold question whether software is copyrightable.  Google omits 
that analysis.  Sega considered—and rejected—the “argument that 
object code is not eligible for the full range of copyright protection.”  977 
F.2d at 1519. Discussing § 102(a), Sega recognized that Congress 
“unambiguously extended copyright protection to computer programs.”  
Id.  “The statutory language, read together with the CONTU report, 
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the copyright in a computer 
program extends to the object code version of the program.”  Id. at 1520.  
Accordingly, Sega held that the code Accolade “copied [was] protected 
Case: 13-1021      Document: 134     Page: 35     Filed: 07/03/2013
25
expression.”  Id. at 1524-25.  In so concluding, Sega rejected “scholarly 
authority” “that object code is not [protectable],” id. at 1519, including 
some of the same commentators who now appear before this Court, see
Law Professors Amicus Br. (including Samuelson) in Sega v. Accolade, 
republished at 33 Jurimetrics J. 147, 153-54 n.17 (1992-1993) (citing 
Prof. Samuelson in advocating against protection for object code).
In Sony, the copied code was so clearly copyrightable that 
Connectix did not contest the point.  Still, the court never would have 
addressed fair use if it believed the code was unprotectable, since fair 
use applies only to “copyrighted work.”  17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis 
added).
Ignoring all this, Google fixates on the opinions’ fair-use analyses, 
characterizing them as “controlling” on “copyrightability.”  GB 29.  
Google justifies the ploy on the ground that the “fair-use rulings were 
predicated and dependent upon fully considered holdings that the 
compatibility elements are not copyrightable under section 102(b).”  
GB 39 (emphasis omitted).  That is where Google’s favorite sentence 
comes in:  “[C]omputer programs … contain many logical, structural, 
and visual display elements that are dictated by the function to be 
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performed, by considerations of efficiency, or by external factors such as 
compatibility requirements and industry demands.”   Sega, 977 F.2d at 
1524 (emphasis added).  
Nothing in this sentence in any way contradicts the point, 
explained above (at 12-20), that functional works are protectable so long 
as there are alternative ways to achieve that same function.  Nor does it 
change the law (explained at OB 52-53, 63-65, and addressed below, at 
34-37) that, for the copyrightability analysis, external factors such as 
compatibility requirements and industry standards are measured at the 
time of creation of the original work (here, Java), and no such 
considerations constrained the original Java developers.
In any event, nothing in that sentence, or the rest of Sega, can be 
read as suggesting that an intricate array of 7000 lines of concededly 
original and creative computer code, GB 5, 29-30, is completely devoid 
of copyright protection—especially when Sega already found that the 
software in question was entitled to copyright protection.  977 F.2d at 
1519-20, 1525.  Saying that certain “elements of computer programs are 
not copyrightable,” GB 39 (emphasis added), is not the same as saying 
that the entire work loses all copyright protection.  As our opening brief 
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explains (at 46), but Google never addresses, the Supreme Court has 
held that even if a work “contains absolutely no protectable written 
expression,” the original “selection or arrangement” of the unprotectable 
elements is protected so long as it “entail[s] a minimal degree of 
creativity,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, which is already conceded here, GB 5, 
29-30.
The rest of Sega’s fair-use discussion confirms the point.  Google’s 
favorite sentence was the culmination of the court’s analysis of the 
“second [fair use] factor, the nature of the copyrighted work.”  977 F.2d 
at 1524.  The discussion concerned “the extent of copyright protection,” 
id. (emphasis added)—not whether the entire program was unworthy of 
copyright protection.  And Sega acknowledged that “the programmer’s 
choice of program structure and design may be highly creative and 
idiosyncratic,” id., as Oracle’s structures are, even though “computer 
programs are, in essence, utilitarian articles—articles that accomplish 
tasks.”  Id.3
                                     
3 Sony adds nothing more.  It reaches the same holding:  “We 
conclude that, under the facts of this case and our precedent, 
[defendant’s] intermediate copying and use of [plaintiff’s] copyrighted 
[work] was a fair use for the purpose of gaining access to the 
unprotected elements of [plaintiff’s work].”  203 F.3d at 602.
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In the end, to read Sega’s and Sony’s fair-use analyses as Google 
does—removing protection for a work just because it has functional 
elements—would require this Court to conclude that those fair-use 
cases silently rejected the Supreme Court’s teachings in Feist and 
Mazer; the CONTU Report’s analysis of the interaction between 
§ 102(b) and computer programs; the Ninth Circuit’s teaching that “the 
structure, sequence and organization” “of computer software may be 
protected by copyright where they constitute expression,” Johnson 
Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175, 1177; and this Court’s interpretation of 
Ninth Circuit law in Atari.  Worse, it would require this Court to accept 
that those two cases somehow preempted more recent Ninth Circuit 
opinions recognizing that “source and object codes[] can be subject to 
copyright protection,” JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1125 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2010), as can the “original selection and arrangement” of 
computer programs without any reference to their functionality, Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(quotation marks omitted).  These fair-use analyses cannot be stretched 
that far.  
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Infringement principles.  Google also littered its brief with 
references to the notion that protection of a particular work can be 
“thin” or “weak.”  E.g., GB 2, 5, 42, 70.  This concept, too, is not about 
the threshold question of copyrightability.  Whether copyright 
protection is “thin” or “broad” can be relevant to fair use (which is how 
Sega used it).  But it typically arises in the first instance in the 
infringement analysis:  i.e., whether the accused work is sufficiently 
similar to the original to constitute infringement.  Where protection is 
broad, plaintiffs need to prove only that the accused work is 
“substantially similar,” Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 
913-14 (9th Cir. 2010), whereas if thin, plaintiffs must prove that the 
accused work is “virtually identical,” Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 
(9th Cir. 2003).  
Infringement concepts, like fair use, are irrelevant to the 
threshold question whether Oracle’s declaring code is copyrightable.  
First, such cases do not hold that computer programs are devoid of all 
copyright protection.  Citing Sega, Google repeatedly asserts that 
generally software “receives only weak protection,” GB 2, 42, 70 
(emphasis added; quotation marks omitted); see GB 2, 5, 42 (“thin”).  As 
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discussed in fair use (at 53-55), that is wrong.  But even if that repeated 
assertion were right, it amounts to a concession that the work here is 
not entirely devoid of copyright protection, as the district court 
erroneously concluded. 
Second, cases considering the robustness of copyright protection 
are irrelevant where, as here, the defendant admits that it copied.  Feist
teaches that “[t]o establish infringement, two elements must be proven: 
(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.” 499 U.S. at 361.  Focusing on 
the second prong, where the “copying of constituent elements” is 
admitted, the only question is whether the elements “are original”—
that is, contain protected expression.  Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 
F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).  “[A] 
substantial similarity analysis may be useful in a copyright case when 
the alleged infringer denies that he in fact copied the plaintiff’s work….  
But … the substantial similarity analysis is inapposite to the copying 
issue” where defendants “admit that they in fact copied phrases from” 
the original work.  Id. at 566.  
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Because Google admits it copied, the only question is therefore 
whether what Google copied was sufficiently original to be protected.  
D. Google’s Merger And Interoperability Arguments 
Have No Bearing On The Copyrightability Of Oracle’s 
Work.
Google’s merger and interoperability arguments are irrelevant to 
the question whether Oracle’s packages are copyrightable.  Both 
arguments rely on the same premise: even though Oracle had limitless 
choices when it authored the declaring code and structured the 
packages—and the code and structure and organization of the packages 
were, therefore, creative and protectable when written—the copyright 
protection evaporated because of something that happened later.  What 
happened later was that the packages became so popular that Google 
wanted to copy them to tap into the Java fan base.  GB 48-51.
If this formulation of Google’s argument was not immediately 
evident, it is because Google twists the meaning of ordinary words to 
obfuscate their true import.  Here are some translations:
“Industry standard”:  Google calls the declaring code “a de facto
industry standard,” GB 10—and then subtly drops the 
hedge, calling it “an industry standard,” GB 5, 55.  But 
Google does not mean that there is some standard-setting 
organization that sets out voluntary disclosure standards 
(there isn’t) or that Oracle promised to let Google or any 
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other commercial enterprise use its work without a license 
(it didn’t).  Google just means that the software packages 
became wildly popular.
“Necessary”:  When Google says that everything it copied was 
“necessary for compatibility,” GB 33, 46-48, it does not 
actually mean “necessary.”  The most Google can assert is 
that “[t]hree of the [37] accused packages”—more precisely, 
750 methods in 61 classes in those three packages—“were 
‘fundamental to … the Java language.’”  GB 19 (quoting 
A140-41); see A20,946-49, 22,385-86, 20,847-49 (discussing 
A5859-60).  But embedded in that assertion is the concession 
that it was not necessary to copy a thing from the other 34 
packages—specifically, 6088 methods in 616 classes and 
interfaces across all 37 packages. A1065; see A22,464.
“Interoperable” and “Compatible”:  When Google says that it 
copied the Java packages to ensure “interoperability with 
existing programs written in” Java, GB 49, and that any use 
of the Java packages “was dictated by … external factors 
such as compatibility requirements,” it does not mean that it 
developed a product that was in fact “interoperable” or 
“compatible.”  Google admits that Android is not
interoperable with Java, OB 65-66, in that “you won’t be able 
to write an Android app while also using [Java]-specific 
classes,” A2102.   Rather, Google means that it wanted to 
harness the popularity of the declaring code and 
organization of certain Java packages so that Android would 
have a pre-existing community of followers who were 
accustomed to Java.  OB 17-18.
“Imperfect interoperability”:  When Google invokes the district 
court’s assertion that Android achieved “a degree of 
interoperability” or “imperfect interoperability,” A167, 
GB 26, it does not mean that there is any significant degree 
to which Android apps run on Java and vice versa.  A21,503-
04, 22,386-87, 22,463.  There isn’t.  Instead, Google means 
that it took the packages of code that were most valuable to 
it—because programmers would expect to find them in a 
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smartphone development platform, GB 18-19; McNealy Br. 
25—and left behind the packages that were less useful.
With this Google-English Dictionary, this Court can begin to 
understand Google’s interoperability and merger arguments.  Both 
arguments build upon the district court’s observation that once Google 
decided to tap into the Java community by using commands that were 
familiar, “there is only one way to declare a given method functionality” 
and “everyone using that function must write that specific line of code 
in the same way.”  GB 15 (quoting A136).  Both arguments rely on 
Google’s idiosyncratic definition of what is “necessary”:  “Google was 
just trying to make Android more attractive to programmers who know 
the Java API conventions,” GB 55, and once Google decided to do that,
“[t]here is no choice in how to express” a particular command, GB 15 
(quoting A139).  But there is no dispute that Google always had the 
option of writing its own platform in the Java language without using 
the bulk of the declaring code that Oracle made so popular.  Which is 
why Google does not deny that both arguments are no different from 
Ann Droid saying, “My copying was ‘necessary’ to tap into the Harry 
Potter fan base.”  OB 1, 63.  
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As our opening brief explained, Google’s notion that copyright
protection evaporates with popularity has never been the law.  
OB 52-53, 63-65.  The Copyright Act declares that a work acquires 
copyright protection at the moment it is “fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and that “[c]opyright in a work … 
subsists from its creation and[] … endures for [the copyright] term,” id.  
§ 302(a); see Oman Br. 24.  As the Ninth Circuit explains, “the design of 
the [Copyright] Act … was clearly to protect all works of authorship 
from the moment of their fixation in any tangible medium of 
expression.”  Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 
524 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting CONTU Report at 21).4
This rule yields two conclusions.  First, once the author creates 
the work and fixes it in a tangible medium, a defendant’s subsequent 
                                     
4 It is telling that one of Google’s main arguments for why this 
should be the law for copyright is that a trademark may become a 
generic term that others may use if consumer perception changes over 
time.  GB 50.  But as the statutory quotes in the text demonstrate, 
unlike trademarks, copyright protection does not turn on consumer 
perception.  “[I]t is to be expected that … expression in a highly 
successful copyrighted work will become part of the language.  That 
does not mean they lose all protection in the manner of a trade name 
that has become generic.”  Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 
F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
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desire “to achieve total compatibility … is a commercial and competitive 
objective which does not enter into the … question of whether particular 
ideas and expressions have merged.”  Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253 
(quoted by OB 64-65 but never addressed by Google).  The cases 
supporting this conclusion are legion.  See, e.g., Atari, 975 F.2d at 840 
(“External factors did not dictate the design of [plaintiff’s] 10NES 
program”); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, 
Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2002) (expert’s “testimony” about 
“interoperability … wholly misplaced” because expert “focused on 
externality from the viewpoint of [defendant’s] program, not 
[plaintiff’s]”); Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375 (chastising district court for 
considering “whether external factors … justified [defendant’s] copying” 
because inquiry “should have remained upon the external factors that 
dictated [plaintiff’s] selection” of programming); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. 
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1347 & n.12 (1994) (rejecting 
that defendant’s desire to achieve “compatibility” is relevant to 
copyright), amended on other grounds, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995); see 
also Oman Br. 18-23 (collecting cases).
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Second, Google’s “industry standard” argument fails, too.  GB 50.  
It also ignores a massive body of caselaw—including from the Ninth 
Circuit—rejecting the argument that a work’s overwhelming success is 
a basis for denying copyrightability.  See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. 
Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 517, 520 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (“PMI”) (as 
amended) (physician coding system copyrightable even when 
government mandated its use, making it the “industry standard”); CCC 
Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73 
(2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting that car values in the Red Book “[fell] into the 
public domain” and lost copyright protection); Kepner-Trego, Inc. v. 
Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 537 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
that “wildly successful” work was no longer copyrightable); Educ. 
Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 540 (3d Cir. 1986) (“possible 
domination in [a particular] field … cannot excuse copying … and 
patently does not affect the validity of [plaintiff’s] copyright”).
Google proposes an alternative rule:  In determining 
copyrightability, “it only makes sense to look at the options available to 
the alleged infringer (ex post).”  GB 48.  But Google does not even try to 
reconcile its proposed rule with the above-quoted language from the 
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Copyright Act or the overwhelming caselaw cited above and in the 
opening brief (at 52-53, 63-64).5  
Instead, Google, once again, cites only the fair-use discussions in 
Sega and Sony, GB 48-50, and commentators (who, themselves, rely on 
Sega), GB 50-51.  But the answer here is the same as above:  Those 
passages were about fair use, not copyrightability—about whether it 
was fair to use a work despite its copyright protection.  So naturally 
they focused on the infringer’s use rather than the original author’s 
clean slate.  These fair-use cases do nothing to overcome the statute and 
overwhelming body of law holding that copyrightability is determined 
at inception.
To the same effect is Google’s one squib from CONTU:  “[W]hen 
specific instructions even though previously copyrighted, are the only 
and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by 
another will not amount to infringement.”  GB 48 (alterations omitted) 
(quoting Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524 (quoting CONTU Report at 20)).  That 
                                     
5 Google addresses only PMI, which it tries to minimize as applying 
only to cases of “wholesale copying.”  GB 49-50 n.145.  But Google’s 
copying was wholesale.  Supra at 7, 10.  Plus, PMI’s rejection of the very 
same “industry standard” argument had nothing to do with the amount 
of copying. 
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passage does not say, as Google contends, that work that was 
“copyrighted” loses copyright protection.  Rather, it just restates the 
idea/expression distinction.  As the immediately preceding CONTU text 
confirms:  “The ‘idea-expression identity’ provides that copyrighted 
language may be copied without infringing when there is but a limited 
number of ways to express a given idea [i.e., merger].”  CONTU Report 
at 20 (emphasis added).  Significantly, CONTU repeatedly emphasizes 
(including in the passage quoted by Sega and Google), only the merger 
doctrine bars copyright protection, and merger rarely applies because 
“[t]he availability of alternative noninfringing language is the rule 
rather than the exception” for computer programs. Id. at 20 n.106.
This case is the rule, not the exception.  At the risk of repetition:  
Google never disputes (or even addresses) that there were countless 
ways for Oracle to write the declaring code and to design, structure, and 
organize the packages to achieve particular functions.  Supra at 7-8, 14.  
Thus, merger does not apply.  And years later, when Google wrote 
Android, Google, too, had any number of ways to write declaring code 
for the same functions, so long as it was prepared to build its own fan 
base rather than hitching its wagon to Oracle’s success.  OB 52; 
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Spafford Br. 7-8, 12-19 (ellipse-drawing example); McNealy Br. 18-20 
(time-zone example).  So Google’s interoperability argument fails as 
well.
E. Oracle Preserved All Facets Of The District Court’s 
Copyrightability Ruling.
As noted above (at 10-11), Google scarcely addresses the legal 
conclusions that flow from its concession that it literally copied 7000 
lines of original code.  Google’s excuse is that these arguments are 
“waived due to Oracle’s failure to object to instructions and a verdict 
form that effectively eliminated that theory from the case.”  GB 67.  
Oracle did not waive that theory, and neither Google nor the district 
court thought it did.
When Google asserts that the instruction and verdict form 
“eliminated that theory,” it tacitly concedes, as it must, that the literal 
copying arguments were in the case going into trial.  Before trial, both 
Google and Oracle identified the “declarations of the API elements in 
the Android class library source code” as the code “accuse[d] of 
copyright infringement.”  A24,632, 24,636.  But there was no need to 
give the issue to the jury, because Google conceded it.  While Google 
quotes one part of the instruction, it leaves out the critical sentence 
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where the court instructed the jury:  “[Android] uses the same names 
and declarations,” i.e., declaring code.  A984-85, 22,771-73; accord
GB 18; A134.  On infringement, the court wanted the jury to decide 
whether Android’s structure and organization were substantially 
similar to Java’s, but there was nothing for the jury to decide regarding 
verbatim copying of declaring code itself.
Google understood that the literal copying remained very much in 
the case when it argued, both at the close of evidence and after the 
verdict, that it “[wa]s entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the 
names and declarations from the 37 API packages that appear in the 
Android source code are not copyrightable.”   A24,644 (emphasis added); 
see A974, A86-88.  Google has not explained why it needed that ruling if 
the theory was already waived.
The district court, too, confirmed that verbatim copying of 
declaring code remained in the case.  It issued its copyright order after 
the verdict.  The order stated:  “This order addresses and resolves … 
whether the elements replicated by Google from the Java system were 
protectable by copyright in the first place.”  A132.  The “elements 
replicated by Google” included “identical lines [of code] that specify the 
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names, parameters and functionality of the methods and classes, lines 
called ‘declarations’ or ‘headers’”— i.e., declaring code.  A136 (emphasis 
added).  The copyright order then addressed copyrightability of the 
declaring code, including the short-phrases analysis.  A162-65; see
SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., 695 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (no waiver where parties “understood” specific argument had 
broader applicability).  Google never explains why the district court 
would have gone to the trouble of deciding that issue if it had been 
waived.
Accordingly, Google is wrong in arguing that “[a] reversal based 
on copyrightability of the 7,000 lines viewed apart from SSO could not 
alter the judgment.”  GB 67.  The court’s judgment of noninfringement 
addressed both theories.  And reversing that judgment on either theory 
necessarily revives a judgment of infringement whether by jury verdict 
(for structure and organization) or by judgment as a matter of law (for 
verbatim copying).
F. Google’s Policy Arguments Are Unavailing.
Google and its amici argue that copyright protection for the 
declaring code is “anti-competitive” and “over-broad,” Rackspace Br. 22, 
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and will be used “as a weapon to block innovation,” Start-ups Br. 12; see
GB 45; Computer Scientists Br. 2-4, 21; CCIA Br. 5.  But history shows 
the opposite.  Since the Copyright Act expanded to protect computer 
programs, software companies—including Facebook,6 Instagram,7 and 
even Google8—have used copyright to protect their work.  Yet the 
software industry continues to thrive.  BSA Br. 3-4.  Still, as Google’s 
amicus contends, programs that are open and available are more likely 
to succeed, Rackspace Br. 8, 17-18, which provides copyright owners a 
strong incentive to license reasonably—as Oracle has.  OB 13-15; 
McNealy Br. 21-23; Microsoft Br. 15-16.  
No doubt it is faster, cheaper, easier, and more profitable for later 
companies to steal an innovator’s work rather than license or create it 
themselves.  See Start-ups Br. 8-10, 13.  But our copyright laws have 
always resisted such expediency on the philosophy that “the best way to 
                                     
6 Compare Rackspace Br. 8 with https://www.facebook.com/ 
legal/terms ¶ 9.9 (“You will not sell, transfer, or sublicense our code, 
APIs, or tools.”) (last accessed, June 30, 2013).
7 Compare Computer Scientists Br. 25-27 with http://instagram.com/ 
about/legal/terms/api/ ¶ 3 (“The Instagram APIs may be protected by 
copyrights.”) (last accessed, June 30, 2013).
8 Compare Rackspace Br. 8 with http://code.google.com/apis/youtube/ 
terms.html (last accessed, June 30, 2013).
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advance public welfare” is to “encourage[]” authors to engage in 
“individual effort by” offering them “personal gain.”  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 
219; accord U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106.  For all their policy 
expositions, Google and its amici never address, much less refute, that 
Oracle would never have “invested as heavily in Java” if it knew its 
“investment of millions of dollars and years of development time would 
not receive copyright protection.”  McNealy Br. 1; see id. at 26 (no 
protection “would have deterred Sun from maintaining its decades-long 
mission to revolutionize computer software development”); cf. Microsoft 
Br. 3-4, 8 (district court’s opinion undermines the balance copyright law 
achieves in incentivizing development and promoting innovation); 
Oman Br. 2-3, 27.
Of course, Google is free to advocate for changes in copyright law, 
and is doing so vigorously.  See, e.g., Picture Archive Council of America 
(“PACA”) Br. 12-13 (discussing Google’s anti-copyright history).  But 
“[n]o matter how persuasive the policy arguments … , this [C]ourt is not 
the proper forum in which to debate them. Where Congress has the 
clear power to enact legislation, [this Court’s] role is only to interpret 
and apply that legislation … not rewrite the … laws ….”  Roche Prods. 
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v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded on 
other grounds by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
II. GOOGLE’S COMMERCIALLY MOTIVATED AND ILLICIT 
VERBATIM COPYING IS NOT FAIR USE
Every day Google uses pilfered Oracle work to achieve ever 
greater popularity and marginalize Oracle in a marketplace where 
Oracle had positioned itself to be a major participant.  Google suggests 
(at 68-74) that another trial is necessary to determine whether it can 
demonstrate fair use.  No such retrial is necessary.  Google’s defense 
fails as a matter of law.  See OB 68-77.  Eager to bring its product to 
market quickly, Google copied the declaring code and structure and 
organization of 37 of the 166 packages in Oracle’s Java SE and then 
added its own packages.  In so doing, Google not only advanced its own 
commercial interests but produced a platform incompatible with Java 
and stole the Oracle business customers licensing Java SE in the 
mobile-phone market.  Fair use does not authorize copying critical 
portions of a copyrighted software platform and then incorporating the 
copied work into a competing platform.9
                                     
9 Google leads its fair-use argument with the assertion that “nine 
presumably reasonable jurors reportedly found that Google had proved 
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Despite its heavy reliance on the fair-use portions of Sega and 
Sony, Google has little to say in response to Oracle’s fair-use points.  
Compare OB 68-77 with GB 68-74.  Below, we address what little 
Google does say. 
A. Factor 1:  Google’s Commercially Motivated Copying 
Is Neither Transformative Nor Intermediate.
Google does not dispute that its use is commercial—to the tune of 
“billions of dollars,” OB 70 (quoting A21,594)—which “tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use,” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 585 (1994); Sony, 203 F.3d at 606.  But Google asserts that it 
satisfies the first factor (“the purpose and character of the use”) because 
its use of Oracle’s work is “transformative” and merely aimed at 
achieving “interoperability.”  GB 68-70.  Both arguments are incorrect.  
Android is not transformative.  A work is “transformative” 
when it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character,” thereby “altering the first [work] with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphases added).  
                                                                                                                       
that defense.”  GB 68.  There is nothing in the record about the jury 
vote.  Google tried to cite a blog posting .  The blog is not in the record 
and therefore not in the appendix.
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To be transformative, the new use must change the very nature of the 
original, giving it “an entirely different function.”  Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).  As abstract 
as that sounds, concrete examples demonstrate just how different the 
new work must be in order to qualify as transformative.
Turning a pop song into a rap song is not transformative, 
inasmuch as both have the purpose of entertaining a listening audience.  
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-82.  Even turning it into a rap parody, 
which obviously has at least some additional purpose of “commenting” 
on the original, id. at 579, is not necessarily transformative, id. at 
578-82.  If an “infringer merely uses [the work] to get attention or to 
avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness 
in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not 
vanish).”  Id. at 580 (emphasis added); see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (O.J. Simpson 
satire utilizing Dr. Seuss’s A Cat in the Hat is not a fair-use parody).
Similarly, in Harper & Row (see OB 71, 74), The Nation failed the 
first factor when it verbatim reproduced the juiciest tidbits of President 
Ford’s memoir even though the new work was couched as news, and 
Case: 13-1021      Document: 134     Page: 57     Filed: 07/03/2013
47
readers typically read newspapers and memoirs for different purposes.  
471 U.S. at 565.  Likewise, it is not transformative to turn an image in 
a photograph into a sculpture, even though the two media are very 
different, see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992), or to 
display copyrighted paintings on a television show when used for “the 
same decorative purpose” as the originals, Ringgold v. Black Entm’t 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1997).  
Android is far less transformative than any of the foregoing 
illustrations.  Oracle’s packages allow programmers to use prewritten 
functions rather than write them from scratch.  The same code in 
Android (e.g., new URL().openConnection()) enables programmers to 
invoke the same pre-programmed functions in exactly the same way.  
Use of declaring code and packages in Android does not serve “an 
entirely different function” from Java.  Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d at 818.  All 
Google did was use the declaring code “to get attention” from 
programmers and “avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”  
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.  
Google argues that “Android is transformative” because “Google’s 
implementation … ‘accounts for 97 percent of the lines of code in [those] 
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packages.’”  GB 69 (quoting A178).  But Google does not dispute that a 
plagiarist cannot excuse copying by showing how much of his work was 
not copied.  OB 42 (citing authorities).  Moreover, though the 
percentage of copying might be relevant to the third factor, it is 
irrelevant to the first factor’s determination of whether the new work is 
transformative.  Thus, as discussed (OB 73)—but not addressed by 
Google—The Nation failed the first factor even though the copying was 
less than 1% of the original.  Accord PACA Br. 17-18.  
Also meritless is Google’s argument that it incorporated the 
packages into “an entirely new smartphone platform.”  GB 69.  Oracle 
already had a platform for sophisticated mobile devices.  Infra at 56-58.  
Google did not transform anything by updating the platform for still 
more sophisticated mobile devices.  Plus, a use is not transformative 
where the copyist “has done no more than find a new way to exploit the 
creative virtues of the original work.”  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 
252 (2d Cir. 2006); see Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of 
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000).  
Not intermediate copying under Sega and Sony.  Google 
argues that Sega and Sony authorize “[a] defendant’s use of copyrighted 
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material to create a new platform that is compatible with existing 
programs.”  GB 69.  That is just another formulation of the argument, 
discussed above (at 31-39), that Google was justified in copying because 
it wanted to (but did not have to) tap into the popularity of the software 
packages.  
Sega and Sony do not help Google in fair use any more than they 
did for copyrightability.  Those cases authorized a use that was much 
more modest than Google’s.  As Google acknowledges, those cases 
addressed only “whether defendants could engage in ‘intermediate 
copying’ of copyrighted computer programs” to “analyze” how to 
“achieve compatibility with these programs.”  GB 33.  The copies at 
issue in Sega and Sony were not final, commercial products, but 
intermediate copies used to figure out how the software works.  In 
contrast, Google’s copying here was for a final, commercial product: 
Android.  
This Court’s opinion in Atari, which set the stage for those Ninth 
Circuit decisions, draws this distinction explicitly.  See Sega, 977 F.2d 
at 1514 n.1 (Sega’s “analysis and … result” is “consistent” with Atari); 
accord id. at 1524 n.7.  In Atari, this Court applied fair-use principles to 
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“new technological innovations,” and distilled the four factors to a 
simple rule:  “fair use reproductions of a computer program must not 
exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected elements of the 
work.”  975 F.2d at 843 (emphasis added).
Sega drew the same distinction.  There, Accolade’s “use of the 
copyrighted material[] was simply to study the functional requirements” 
needed for compatibility—i.e., “reverse engineer[ing]” to learn the 
“twenty to twenty-five bytes of data” needed to make any game work on 
a Sega console.  977 F.2d at 1516, 1522.  Accolade “did not include any 
of Sega’s code” to generate the needed data string, and wrote its own 
games that included “a total of 500,000 to 1,500,000 bytes.”  Id. at 
1515-16.  Contrary to Google’s repeated insinuations that Sony and 
Sega condone “use” of copied code (GB 33, 35, 39), the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that the result would have been different if Accolade had 
done what Google (or Atari) did:  “Our conclusion does not, of course, 
insulate Accolade from a claim of copyright infringement with respect to 
its finished products.”  Id. at 1528 (emphases added); accord id. at 1515.  
The same was true in Sony.  Sony emphasizes repeatedly that “none of 
the Sony copyrighted material was copied into, or appeared in, 
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[defendant’s] final product,” 203 F.3d at 600; accord id. at 598-99, 602, 
606-07, 608 n.11.
This Court has confirmed that “Sega … does not stand for the 
proposition that any form of copyright infringement is privileged as long 
as it is done as part of an effort to explore the operation of a product 
that uses the copyrighted software.”  DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse 
Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (1999).  The DSC defendant 
created a telephone-exchange card that had to download and copy the 
software of the plaintiff’s exchange system to function.  Id. at 1358.  In 
words equally apt here, this Court held that use of the plaintiff’s 
software was not fair because it was not “part of an attempt at reverse 
engineering” but rather “part of the ordinary operation of those cards” 
for business.  Id. at 1363. 
Even if Sega and Sony could be stretched to encompass copying 
that is neither intermediate nor restrained, Google’s entire focus on 
“interoperability” is misplaced.  Here again, Google cannot invoke 
interoperability as an excuse for copying when it intentionally produced 
a platform that was not interoperable in the relevant sense of the word.  
Supra at 32-33.  Google’s expert and the district court agreed that 
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interoperability means a program that “runs on both the Android 
platform and the Java platform.”  A22,348; see A167 (programs that 
“run” on each platform); Spafford Br. 20.  Nevertheless, Google contends 
Android achieved “a degree of interoperability with existing Java 
programs” that use only the 37 copied packages.  GB 26, 55, 72 (quoting 
A167).  But that is just wrong.  Google and its Technical Program 
Manager for Android Compatibility concede that Android is not “Java 
compatible” and does not support “existing Java apps.”  OB 66.  Google’s 
expert admitted that, because “[t]he entry points [in the code] are 
different on the platforms,” any Android or Java “program itself would 
need to be modified … so that it would run on the [the other] platform.”  
A22,386-87.  “[Y]ou don’t really have compatibility,” Oracle’s expert 
explained, A21,503-04, since the Android and Java codes have different 
bytecode architecture, A22,463, and different file formats, compare Trial 
Exhibit (“TX”) 610.210 (Java “.jar” files) with A24,657-59 (Android “.apk” 
files).11  
                                     
10 Submitted in native-file form in Supplemental Joint Appendix.
11 Google’s observation (at 52-53) that the Sony defendant 
implemented some, but not all, of Sony’s functions is misplaced.  The 
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B. Factor 2:  Oracle’s Packages Are Highly Creative.
As to the “nature of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(2), the 
conversation begins and ends with Google’s decision not to contest 
Oracle’s extensive presentation that the work is “original, creative, 
intuitive, attractive,” and so forth.  GB 5 (quoting OB; internal 
quotation marks omitted); see OB 72; McNealy Br. 10-21.  Instead of 
challenging that undeniable reality, Google’s analysis revolves around 
this:  “As Sega recognized, computer programs are ‘essentially 
utilitarian’ in nature, and, under the Copyright Act, ‘if a work is largely 
functional, it receives only weak protection.’”  GB 70 (quoting Sega, 977 
F.2d at 1527).  Sega never said that all computer programs receive 
weak protection.  It said:  “To the extent that there are many possible 
ways of accomplishing a given task or fulfilling a particular market 
demand, the [developer’s] choice of program structure and design may 
be highly creative and idiosyncratic.”  977 F.2d at 1524 (emphasis 
added).   The passage Google selectively quotes says merely that certain 
elements of some computer programs can be dictated by “logical, 
                                                                                                                       
Ninth Circuit did not even bother mentioning the fact, because the 
games in Sony “run” on each system and were thus interoperable. 
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structural, and visual display elements,” and thus receive only weak 
protection.  Id. at 1524.  Google fails to demonstrate any such restraints 
on the original Java developers.  See OB 12-13, 32-33, 39-40, 51-52.  
Google does not respond to other Ninth Circuit authority 
discussed in our opening brief (at 73) finding software to be sufficiently 
creative to warrant broad copyright protection, where, as here, it is 
creative, intuitive, and attractive.  Nor does Google grapple with Atari, 
where this Court reasoned that the software was necessarily “creative” 
and “original,” thus “protectable,” because there were “a multitude of 
expressions” available.  975 F.2d at 840.  
C. Factor 3:  Google Copied The Most Important Parts Of 
The Packages.
On this factor, Google emphasizes, again, that it copied “a small 
fraction of the overall code.”  GB 71.  But the third factor is not just 
about the “amount” but also about the “substantiality of the portion 
used.”  See PACA Br. 21-23.  Google does not respond to Harper & Row, 
which is dispositive.  The copying there, though only 1% of the total, 
was unfair because the “quoted excerpts” were the work’s “dramatic 
focal points” and played a “key role in the infringing work.”  471 U.S. at 
566; see OB 74.  Applying this principle, Google does not dispute that it 
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copied the declaring code of the packages it thought programmers would 
want in a smartphone platform.  GB 18-19; A21,956-58, 21,152-53, 
21,503; McNealy Br. 25 (Google “copied Java’s packages that were most 
useful for mobile platforms”).  Nor does Google dispute that declaring 
code is all-important, because that is the only code programmers ever 
see or use.  OB 20-21, 43-44, 74.  
Here, again, Google latches onto the district court’s reasoning that 
“Google replicated what was necessary to achieve a degree of 
interoperability—but no more.”  GB 71. But this argument depends on 
the same flawed logic as to what was “necessary.”  Supra at 32.  Since 
the undisputed fact is that Google did not need to copy the vast majority 
of the declaring code to write programs in the Java language, id., the 
copying was not necessary in any relevant sense of the word.  It was 
merely desirable to achieve a commercial objective.  That makes it 
unfair.
D. Factor 4:  Android Hurt The Market And Potential 
Market For Derivative Works Of Java SE.
Android caused significant “harm to the market” and “potential
market” “for derivative works” of Java SE.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 
at 568; 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).  Google completely ignores the “harm to the 
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potential market” that would ensue from infringement such as 
Android’s “becom[ing] widespread,” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 
(citation omitted), and barely addresses the actual market harm 
Android caused.  
Perhaps the starkest illustration of harm was Oracle’s market for 
licensing of Java ME for mobile devices and of its dedicated smartphone 
platform.  Market harm does not get any more concrete than the 
illustration in our opening brief, to which Google never responds:  
Amazon licensed Java ME and its platform for its electronic reader, 
Kindle.  OB 28-29, 77.  But, when Amazon selected the platform for its 
new e-reader, the Kindle Fire, it abandoned Java in favor of the (free) 
Android platform.  
Google concedes that, before Android, Oracle “dominated” the
mobile platform market, GB 17, through licensing of a Java SE 
derivative, Java ME, see OB 15; A20,708.  But Google insists that does 
not matter because Java ME was for “feature phones” while Android is 
for “smartphones.”  GB 72 (citation omitted).  Google does not dispute, 
however, that Oracle licensed Java ME to “just about every smart 
phone carrier … around the world,” A22,237, including smartphones 
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such as RIM’s BlackBerrys, Danger’s Sidekicks, and Nokia’s Series 60s, 
OB 71. To differentiate some smartphones from others (as Google does) 
slices the “market” too thin.  The “market for derivative works” here is 
the market for mobile device platforms, not the market for platforms 
that support a specific generation of phones.  See Twin Peaks Prods., 
Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(“extraordinar[ily] detail[ed]” reports of TV episodes were “adequate 
substitute[s]” and undermined market for the shows).  
Google only underscores the profound impact it had on Oracle’s 
market by quoting the district court’s observation (albeit not from any 
fair-use analysis) that “Oracle never successfully developed its own 
smartphone platform.”  GB 72 (quoting A135).  “When Google made 
Android available for free, Oracle was effectively competing with a free 
version of its own program.”  McNealy Br. 7.  The business case for 
Oracle selling a dedicated smartphone platform (Java FX) evaporated, 
A20,490—another classic example of a superseding use.  OB 76-77; 
A6142 (“Google is both a potentially key adopter of Java FX due to their 
strong support of Java on non-Android devices … but they are also a 
potentially dangerous competitor.”).   
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Android also harmed the potential market for a Java smartphone 
device.  Sun/Oracle contemplated creating a Java smartphone—
separate from the Java FX platform.  A20,490-95; see GB 21 (citing 
A20,487).  Building a Java smartphone was one reason Oracle 
purchased Sun.  A8248, 20,487-90.  Oracle even built a prototype and 
devised a strategy to charge carriers for the phone rather than 
advertising (like Google does).  A20,490, 20,495-96.  Thus, there can be 
no doubt that smartphones represented a “potential market” for the 
Java platform.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).  
Against all this, Google argues that Android is not a derivative of 
Java.  GB 72-73.  That is beside the point.  Factor four considers harm 
to derivatives (i.e., harm to Oracle’s Java SE derivatives), which has 
nothing to do with whether the infringing work (Android) is itself a 
derivative.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.    
Google also responds with Sega (at 73), but there the copying 
likely helped the market prospects of the original author:  Accolade’s 
copying “led to an increase in the number of independently designed 
video game programs offered for use with the [Sega] console.”  977 F.2d
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at 1523 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, Sega suffered only “minor 
economic loss,” id. at 1524, and the court found “no basis” for concluding 
that Accolade’s copying “significantly affected the market” for Sega’s 
work, id. at 1523.  Here, by contrast, no Android program can run on 
any Java platform, and Oracle has no possible upside in the unlicensed 
copying of its work.
E. Any Remand Must Be Limited To Fair Use Only.
Google argues in one sentence that if there is a remand on fair 
use, this Court must also order a new trial on infringement.  GB 73-74.  
Google’s argument improperly relies on incorporation-by-reference of 
briefs it filed below.  Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2006).  Moreover, Google admits that it copied the declaring 
code and the structure and organization of the packages.  It is not 
entitled to a trial on an issue that it conceded and on which it offers no 
legitimate defense. 
Even if Google had a triable issue, it is not entitled to a retrial of 
an issue it already tried and lost.  The question whether Google’s 
copying of Oracle’s code constitutes infringement is “distinct and 
separable” from whether Google can establish fair use.  Gasoline Prods. 
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Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931).  The two issues 
are not “interwoven,” and it would not create any “confusion and 
uncertainty” to submit fair use to the jury without allowing that jury to 
decide infringement as well.  Id.
CROSS APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Google admits it copied portions of Oracle’s code verbatim into the 
Android platform and that the portions of code are copyrightable.  Is 
Google’s copying copyright infringement?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Java platform includes eight files that contain security 
functions governing access to network files.  A21,501-02.  Google 
decompiled those files and then copied them identically, “in their 
entirety,” into Android.  A989, 1058A-B; accord A21,431-32, 21,919.  
Google “agrees that the accused lines of code” (i.e., the eight files)—
containing hundreds of lines of code—“came from [Oracle’s] copyrighted 
material.”  A989; accord A1058A-B, 3552-69, 21,431-32, 21,875-76.
The Java platform also includes nine lines of original source code 
from “java.util.arrays.java,” called “rangeCheck.”  A21,426-27.  
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“rangeCheck” facilitates an important sorting function, frequently 
called upon during the operation of Java and Android.  A2877-937, 
20,923, 21,501, 21,427, 21,436. 
As the parties agreed and the jury was instructed, A989, Android 
includes the identical nine lines of code in the files “Timsort.java” and 
“ComparableTimSort.java.”  A21,426-27, 5980; compare A2877-937 with
A1819-37.  Android mobile devices call the rangeCheck code 2,600 times 
just while powering on.  A21,501.  After start-up, many other files 
continue to call upon rangeCheck.  A21,488. 
At trial, Google conceded direct copying of both rangeCheck and 
the security files.  Google did not claim “fair use,” A42, instead raising 
as a defense “only” that its copying “[wa]s de minimis.”  A989.  
The jury was instructed:  “With respect to … rangeCheck and 
other similar files [i.e., security files], Google agrees that the accused 
lines of code and comments came from the copyrighted material but 
contends that the amounts involved were so negligible as to be de 
minimis and thus should be excused.”  A989 (emphasis added).  
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As to rangeCheck, the jury rejected Google’s de minimis defense 
and found infringement.  A42.  The court denied Google’s JMOL.  A124, 
129.
As to the security files, the jury returned a noninfringement 
verdict.  A42.  But, because the testimony showed that Google’s “us[e of] 
the copied files … would have been significant,” and “[t]here was no 
testimony to the contrary,” the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable 
jury could find that this copying was de minimis” and granted Oracle’s 
JMOL.  A1058A-B.  
The district court entered final judgment for Oracle as to the 
security files and the rangeCheck code.  Google appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Google’s efforts to hide behind a so-called “de minimis” exception 
to copyright protection fails.  Where defendants concede verbatim 
copying, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize any de minimis defense.  
Instead, the amount of the copying is evaluated under fair use.  Even 
assuming a de minimis defense, Oracle’s rangeCheck and security files 
are significant.  The judgments of infringement should be affirmed.  
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ARGUMENT
I. THERE IS NO “DE MINIMIS” DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT.  
As a threshold matter, the district court’s judgment can be 
affirmed on the ground that the Copyright Act prohibits copying subject 
only to the limitations of §§ 107-22.  Accordingly, “even a small taking 
may sometimes be actionable.”  Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 
563, 566 (9th Cir. 1993).  
Google argues that its copying of rangeCheck and the security 
files is not infringement because the copying was “de minimis.”  
GB 76-79.  The district court properly concluded that the copying here 
was not de minimis.  § II.  Also, as Oracle urged below, § 102 does not 
include any de minimis exception.  See A24,626 (contending “[n]o de 
minimis exception can, as a matter of law, defeat Oracle’s claim based 
on this copying”); accord A24,602A.12
Though Google contends the amount of verbatim copying must be 
“significant enough to constitute infringement,” GB 76 (quotation marks 
                                     
12 While Oracle did not argue this throughout the proceedings below, 
this Court can affirm “on any ground that finds support in the record.”  
Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957); Rexnord Indus., LLC v. 
Kappos, 705 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Livid Holdings Ltd. v. 
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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omitted), the only provision contemplating consideration of “the 
amount” of copying is the third fair-use factor.  17 U.S.C. § 107(3) 
(“amount and substantiality of the portion” copied).  
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize a freestanding 
de minimis defense.  Norse, 991 F.2d 566.  In Norse, defendants 
published a poet’s biography containing verbatim copies of phrases from 
plaintiff’s unpublished letters to the poet.  The copied phrases appeared 
in a single paragraph of the 768-page biography.  The Ninth Circuit 
held that the case could not be dismissed on de minimis grounds:  “The 
question of whether a copying is substantial enough to be actionable 
may be best resolved through the fair use doctrine, which permits 
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to 
foster.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  See 2 Nimmer & Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.01[G], at 8-26 (the “de minimis … defense 
should be limited largely to its role in determining either substantial 
similarity or fair use”).
Google invokes Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 
2004), involving music sampling.  GB 76-77.  But, as an earlier decided 
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panel decision whose holding is directly on point, Norse is binding here.  
Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003) (“one three-judge 
panel of this court [generally] cannot reconsider or overrule the decision 
of a prior panel” (citation omitted)).  Accordingly, subsequent sampling 
cases in the Ninth Circuit have not followed Newton, see, e.g., Swirsky v. 
Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing sampling claim under 
rubric of sufficient original expression), and Newton has been rejected 
elsewhere, see, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 
792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005) (expressly rejecting “mental gymnastics” of de 
minimis defense).  
As the Ninth Circuit’s disregard of Newton confirms, Newton was 
wrongly decided.  In Newton, the defendant copied a three-note 
sequence from a recording without a license to the composition.  The 
issue was whether the average audience could discern the plaintiff’s 
“hand as a composer … from [the defendants’] use of the sample.”  388 
F.3d at 1196.  Failing to cite Norse and relying instead on out-of-circuit 
authority interpreting the predecessor 1909 Copyright Act (not the 
operative 1976 Copyright Act), Newton held that defendants’ use of the 
three-note composition was de minimis—seemingly carving out a de 
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minimis exception from “the general test for substantial similarity.”  Id. 
at 1193-95.  This was error.  “‘Substantial similarity’ is not an element 
of a claim of copyright-infringement.  Rather, it is a doctrine that helps 
courts adjudicate whether copying … actually occurred ….”  Range 
Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th 
Cir. 2012).  It has no relevance to cases where, as here, verbatim 
copying is conceded.  Id.; Norse, 991 F.2d at 566; see Nimmer, supra,
§ 8.01[G], at 8-26.
In light of the Ninth Circuit’s binding authority in Norse, Google’s 
reliance on Second Circuit precedent is misguided.  GB 77 (citing 
Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74).
Because Google concedes it copied the rangeCheck code and the 
security files, A989, and because Google’s “only” defense to 
infringement—de minimis—is not a cognizable defense, A989, this 
Court should affirm the judgments of infringement.  
II. GOOGLE’S COPYING WAS SIGNIFICANT.  
Even if there is a de minimis defense, the jury reasonably found 
Google’s copying more than de minimis as to rangeCheck and the 
district court correctly held that the defense would fail as a matter of 
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law as to the security files.  Google concedes that copying is not de 
minimis if the copied work is “qualitatively or quantitatively 
significant.”  GB 77 (emphasis added).  The unrefuted record establishes 
that the security files and rangeCheck had substantial significance—
both to Oracle and to Google.  Thus, the jury was correct to find 
infringement of rangeCheck, A42, and the district court was correct to 
hold that no reasonable juror could find anything but infringement of 
the security files, A1058A-B.
As to rangeCheck, Dr. Mitchell presented unrebutted testimony 
that it is significant and called upon often by other files.  In one 
experiment testing the importance of rangeCheck, Dr. Mitchell 
observed that it is called upon at least 2600 times just when an Android 
device is powering on.  A21,501.  This is not disputed.  
As to the security files, Google contends that the “files [a]re 
qualitatively [in]significant to the [Java] platform.”  GB 77.  But that is 
not what the undisputed testimony was:  Dr. Mitchell testified that 
these files are significant because they are “the default implementation 
for the security functions” that “govern access to a network or other 
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resource” in the Java platform.  A21,501-02.  Google offered no evidence 
in response.
Google also argues the security files are not “qualitatively 
significant to … Android” because “they were used to test the [Android] 
platform” but not shipped on any Android devices.  GB 77.  But
companies invest significant time and money developing code to test 
products to ensure that they reach the market without quality issues.  
A21,502-03.  Such testing “is a very important part of the software 
development.”  A21,502.  Indeed, “by many measures the testing and 
quality assurance process can be twice as time consuming or twice as 
expensive as coding originally.”  Id.  In short, code used for testing can 
be as valuable as that used in the end product.  
Google suggests that a minimum number of lines of code must be 
copied before finding infringement.  GB 78-79.  “[N]o bright line rule 
exists as to what quantum of similarity is permitted.”  Baxter v. MCA, 
Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987); Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. 
A10 Networks, Inc., C 10-3428-PSG, 2013 WL 831528, *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 10, 2013) (copying 145 lines of code out of 10 million not de 
minimis); CyberMedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 
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1077 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (copying not de minimis even where the code 
copied comprised a relatively small percentage of the program).  
Because no particular quantum of lines of code needs to be copied 
for infringement, and because the qualitative value of the copied code is 
so substantial, Google cannot show that the district court erred.
III. THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE “WORK AS WHOLE” 
WAS NOT ERRONEOUS OR REVERSIBLE.
Google argues that the jury instruction incorrectly defined “the 
work as a whole” with regard to rangeCheck and the security files.  
GB 75-76.  As an initial matter, this Court need not even reach this 
issue if it agrees with either of the arguments presented above.  An 
instruction regarding quantitative analysis for proving de minimis 
copying is inconsequential if there is no such defense.  The argument 
also does not matter if Oracle proved as a matter of law that the copied 
code was qualititatively significant.
In any event, the district court correctly held, on the facts of this 
case, that the individual code files copied were the work for the purpose 
of evaluating Google’s culpability for direct copying of these files.  
Google’s two-paragraph argument does not show otherwise.  The Ninth 
Circuit holds that “an entire work” can be a subset of a larger work if 
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that work “can stand totally alone.”  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral 
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (1986) (cited by GB 75 n.193).  
“[W]hen a single published unit contains multiple elements ‘that are 
otherwise recognizable as self-contained works,’ the unit is considered a 
single work for the limited purpose of registration, while its elements 
may be recognized as separate works for other purposes.”  A33 (quoting 
37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i)(A)); accord Super Future Equities v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 553 F. Supp. 2d 680, 699-700 (N.D. Texas 2008) (finding 
whole work was the website page, not entire website).
Google does not show the trial court erred in determining that the 
copied code files were stand-alone works.  These files, which are not 
within the 166 packages, can and do stand alone as individual units in 
source- and object-code form.  See A2877-964.  Indeed, the files are the 
tangible medium in which the copied expression is fixed and from which 
Google actually copied, and accordingly were admitted into evidence as 
individual files, each with its own copyright notice and author 
information.  Id.  Under those circumstances, the copying was 
quantitatively significant since, as the district court found, Google 
copied the eight security files “in their entirety.”  A1058A-B.  And 
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Google failed to ever rebut any of the evidence of the files’ function and 
significance.  Supra at 67-69.
CONCLUSION
On Oracle’s appeal, this Court should reverse the district court’s 
judgment and enter judgment on liability for Oracle.  On Google’s cross-
appeal, this Court should affirm the district court’s judgment.
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